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This article reviews developments in international mergers, acquisitions, and joint ven-
tures during the year 2012.1 Because of space limitations, this year's article reviews only
developments from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and from nine selected jurisdic-
tions: Denmark, Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey,
Ukraine, and the United States. Additional country reports can be found on the commit-
tee's website.2
I. European Court of Justice
In its recent decision in Vale,3 the ECJ strengthened the cross-border mobility of com-
panies within the European Union. In Vale, an Italian limited liability company resolved
the transfer of its registered office to Hungary. Following the resulting deletion from the
commercial register in Rome and conclusion of the articles of the respective Hungarian
limited liability company, the Hungarian authorities declined registration. The ECJ qual-
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LLP); Israel - Ronald Lehmann and Sharon Rosen (Fischer Behar Chen Well Orion & Co.); Luxembourg -
Dirk Leermakers and Claire-Marie Darnand (Stibbe); The Netherlands - Nancy A. Matos (Baker &
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ified the case as a cross-border conversion and applied Articles 49 and 54 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)4 to hold that the freedom of establish-
ment, together with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, require an EU mem-
ber state to allow for (inbound) cross-border conversions to the same extent it provides for
such conversions in its own national legal forms.
The ECJ has decided a significant number of major cases on the cross-border mobility
of companies. Most recently, the court held that cross-border mergers fall within the
freedom of establishment.5 With respect to cross-border conversions, it had remained
unclear6 whether the national legislature can exclude foreign legal forms-an issue now
clarified by Vale, which obliges the member state to treat foreign legal forms at least
equivalent to national entities. Various countries recognize statutory mergers, demergers,
and conversions as special corporate transactions. The EU Merger Directive exclusively
regulates the subject matter of cross-border mergers between member states.7
The ECJ's jurisdiction has a direct effect only on cross-border mergers within the EU.
Inbound or outbound transactions, on the other hand, remain subject to applicable na-
tional laws. According to the ECJ, a conversion is not only the change of the same com-
pany's legal form to another legal form, but also the cross-border change from one legal
form into the same legal form.
The structuring opportunities, according to Vak, are broad compared to certain aspects
of the EU Merger Directive. First, the latter exclusively applies to limited liability compa-
nies,8 although following the ECJ's recent case law, other legal forms must enjoy the same
freedoms as well. Second, the EU Merger Directive specifically provides for employee
participation,9 which may substantially slow down the merger process. Third, real estate
transfer taxes that may arise upon a merger may not apply in cases of a conversion with
unchanged continuation of ownership.
Due to the lack of applicable legislation on cross-border conversions, the ECJ postu-
lates a consecutive application of the two national laws. While this is in theory an under-
standable approach, in practice the resulting need to coordinate the applicable national
laws causes a great potential for uncertainty. It begins with the false implication that the
process can be clearly divided into two phases: that of the converting company's member
state and that of the converted company's member state. Usually, however, a member
state will deem the conversion to have become effective upon registration thereof with the
authority competent for the converted company and will therefore not cease to be relevant
at an earlier stage. Coordination issues that drive from this dilemma concern, e.g., details
of applicable provisions on formation, shareholders' identity, treatment of "unknown"
shareholders, capital maintenance, debtor protection, liability and (notarial or other) form.
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 49, 54, May 9,
2008, 2008 OJ. (C 115) 47.
5. Case C-411/03, Sevic Systems AG, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10805, 91 17, 19.
6. See Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktat6 6s Szolgiltat6 bt, 2008 E.C.R. 1-09641, 1 125.
7. Council Directive 2005/56, 2005 OJ. (L 310) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU Merger Directive].
8. Id. art. 2.
9. Id. art 16.
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II. Denmark
A. TRENDS IN THE 2012 M&A MARKET
M&A deal activity in Denmark has declined significantly since the financial crisis in
2008. The M&A market regained some terrain in 2010, but the latest developments in
Southern Europe have created some setback in the confidence affecting Danish M&A
activities. Looking at qualifying transactions in Denmark since 2005, the first three
quarters of 2012 are at the lowest level of finalized transactions ever with total transactions
at 259 compared to 391 transactions in 2007.10
Although difficult to single out any one factor causing the drop in transaction activity,
the darkest shadow is being cast by the continued financial crisis and uncertainty in future
economic developments. This has led to monetary restrictions, challenging debt-financ-
ing, and a significantly lower level of acquisition loans compared to the pre-crisis levels.
Danish financial institutions are still reluctant to provide financing and the market is
mainly focused on companies with unique business models, strong market positions, high
margins, and good future growth potentials.
B. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 2012
Legal developments and new legislation initiatives during 2012 have been limited. The
implementation of the new Danish Companies Act (the Act)" adopted in 2009 is now
almost finalized, and the Danish Business Authority has implemented all parts of the Act,
except for the electronic shareholders' registry.12 Until the system is implemented, the
shareholders' registry is kept and updated by the company's central governing body (man-
agement or the board of directors).13 The central registry should be operational by late
2013.
The Act has also loosened restrictions on acquisition financing, bringing the Danish
regulation in line with the rest of the EU and in accordance with the amendment of the
second company directive.14 The change of the Act makes it possible for a target com-
pany to provide financial assistance to a buyer provided certain pre-conditions are ful-
filled.' 5 It is expected that this will provide new opportunities for acquisition financing.
10. ERNST & YOUNG TRANSACTION ADVISORY SERVICES, TRANSAicrIONSBAROMETRET [TRANSACION
BAROMETER] 3 (Nov. 2012) (on file with author). The analysis considered five search criteria: (1) at least 30
percent of the share capital was acquired; (2) at least one of the involved parties was Danish; (3) the transac-
tion was announced during the analysis period; (4) the transaction was not cancelled or based on a rumor; and
(5) the transaction was not an IPO, carve-out, or repurchase of a company's own shares. Id. at 2.
11. Lov. No. 470 af 12 Juni 2009, Lov om aktie- og anpartsselskaber (selskabsloven) [Danish Act on Public
and Private Limited Companies (the Danish Companies Act)], pmbl. [hereinafter Danish Companies Act],
available at http://www.dcca.dk/graphics/_ny%20eogs/English%20version/Legislationffhe%20Danish%20
Companies%20Act%20-%2006122010.pdf.
12. See id. pt. 3 (holding that once an electronic shareholder's registry is implemented this will mean that
no central registration of shareholders in unquoted companies will exist).
13. See id. pt. 4.
14. Council Directive 2006/68, 2006 Oj. (L 264) 32, T[ 1 (EC) (amending Council Directive 77/91/EEC
on the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital).
15. See id.
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At the time of writing, the Danish parliament was debating the abolishment of taxation
on unquoted share capital (the so-called entrepreneur-taxation).16 Abolishing the entre-
preneur-taxation 7 may facilitate smaller companies' access to risk or venture capital.
m. Germany
A. LEGISLATION AFFECTING M&A TRANSACTIONS
1. Investor Protection
The Act for the Strengthening of Investor Protection and the Improvement of Capital
Market Efficiencyls aims to enhance the disclosure of equity derivatives relating to shares
of listed companies and impedes hidden stake-building in listed companies.' 9 The new
rules have introduced disclosure of instruments that make it possible for their holder to
acquire shares,20 of return claims under securities loans, and of repurchase claims under
repo transactions.21 In the first months after the new rules have taken effect, disclosure
notifications have spiked considerably.
2. Corporate Acquisitions Via "Loan To Own" Strategies
The Act for the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of BusinesseS22 took effect on
March 1, 2012. It aims at providing easier access to debt-to-equity swaps in insolvency
plan proceedings and should facilitate this type of transaction even before the debtor must
file for insolvency. Now, a debt-to-equity swap as part of an insolvency plan can be imple-
mented regardless of supporting or opposing incumbent shareholders. 23
Incumbent shareholders who know they can be overruled in an insolvency plan will
likely factor this in when negotiating a debt-to-equity swap pre-insolvency. The impair-
ment of incumbent shareholders should be an incentive for hedge funds and other inves-
tors to purchase corporate debt below par value and then push for the conversion of their
debt into equity.
16. Lov. No. 470 af I Nov. 2012, Lov om andring af aktieavancebeskatningsloven, ligningsloven,
lonsumsafgiftsloven og forskellige andre love [Act amending the Capital Gains Tax Act, the Assessment Act,
Payroll Tax Act and various other Acts] (changing the taxation of shares, etc. submitted to the Danish Parlia-
ment), available at http://www.folketingstidende.dk/RIpdf/samling/20121/lovforslag/L49/20121_L49_som_
fremsat.pdf
17. See id.
18. Gesetz zur Stirkung des Anlegerschutzes und Verbesserung der Funktionsfdhigkeit des Kapitalmarkts
[Act to Strengthen Investor Protection and Improve the Functioning of the Capital Market], Apr. 7, 2011,
BUNDESGESETZBLATF, TEIL I [BGBL. I} at 538 (Ger.).
19. Hartmut Krause, Die erweiterte Beteiligringstransparenz bei bonsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften [The Er-
tended Participation of Transparency in Listed Companies], 56 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr 469, 484 (2011) (Ger.)
20. Gesetz Uber den Wertpapierhandell Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHGI [Securities Trading Act], Sept.
9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2708, § 25(a) (Ger.).
21. See DEUrSCHER BUNDESTAG: ANLEGERSCHUTZ-UND FuNKnONSVERBESSERGUNGSGESETz [BT]
17/3628, at 19 (Ger.); see also Krause, supra note 19, at 475.
22. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: BESCHLUSSEMuPFEHLUNG UND BERICHT DEs RECHTSAUSSCHUSSES
[BI] 17/7511 (Ger.).
23. See INsOLvENZORDINUNG [INsO] [LSSOLVENCY STATuTE], Oct. 5, 1994, BGBL. I at 2688, § 225a(2)
(Ger.).
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3. Impediments on "Asset Stripping"
On July 21, 2011, the European Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers
(the Directive)24 took effect. In relation to European M&A, the Directive imposes restric-
tions on distributions, capital reductions, share redemptions, or purchases of a company's
own shares by controlled portfolio companies during the first two years of an ownership
by an Alternative Investment Fund, which in particular includes private equity.25
B. CASE LAw AFFECTING M&A TRANSACTIONS
1. Business Combination Agreements
In preparing a public takeover offer, Business Combination Agreements are used by
bidders to secure the future cooperation of the target's executive management. The Mu-
nich District Court invalidated certain provisions of a Business Combination Agreement
that contradicted mandatory provisions of the German Stock Corporation Act.26
2. Takeover of Postbank by Deutsche Bank
The strategy of a no-premium tender offer ("creeping in" or "low ball offer") aimed at
acquiring a shareholding just above the mandatory bid threshold (i.e., 30 percent of the
voting rights) is quite a new phenomenon. Among others, Deutsche Bank applied it when
bidding for Deutsche Postbank in 2010. Upon a shareholder lawsuit, the Frankfurt Court
of Appeals held, in line with its previous rulings, that individual shareholders have no
grounds to challenge the approval of the offer document by Bundesanstalt fir
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) since the underlying section of the takeover code is
intended to protect the public, not individual shareholders. 27 In civil litigation for a
higher consideration, the Cologne District Court and the Cologne Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed the transaction in detail and dismissed the case. 28 It may be expected that the Fed-
eral Supreme Court will hand down a final ruling.
IV. Israel
The Promotion of Competition and Reduction of Concentration Bill 2012 (the Bill)29
making its way through the Israeli Parliament may lead to significant restructuring in the
Israeli economy. Significantly, the breakup of the country's large multi-layered concerns
that may take place if the Bill is enacted is likely to present opportunities for foreign
investors in the Israeli market.
24. Council Directive 2011/61, Alternative Investment Fund Managers, 2011 OJ. (L 174) 1 (EU).
25. See id. art. 30(1).
26. Landgericht Minchen [Munich Regional Court] Apr. 5, 2012, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESELL-
SCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] I (Ger).
27. Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [High Regional Court of Frankfurt] Dec. 5, 2011, 2012, NEUE FOR
WlRTscHAFTSREcIrr [NZW] 270 (Ger.).
28. Landgericht K61n [Regional Court of K61n] July 29, 2011, 2012 ZErrSCHRiFT FOR WIRTSCHAvr-
sREcrr [NZW] 229 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht K61n [High Regional Court of K61n] Oct. 31, 2012 (Ger.).
29. Draft Bill for the Promotion of Competition and Reduction of Concentration, 5772-2012, http://www.
knesset.gov.il/laws/data/BillGovernment/706/706.pdf.
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A key aspect of the Bill addresses pyramid companies, which are two or more companies
that issue bonds or shares to the public and that are held through a chain of companies
with the same ultimate owner.30 The Bill limits the number of layers of pyramid compa-
nies to two, in the case of new companies, or three, in the case of existing companies. The
Bill generally provides for a six-year implementation period.3
To comply with these restrictions, pyramid companies with more than three layers can:
(1) sell their holdings in the bottom-most layer; (2) make a purchase offer to remove the
publicly held company in the structure from public listings; or (3) merge one or more
companies in the pyramid with its parent company. While continuing to permit a triple-
layer pyramid structure for existing companies, the Bill also requires the boards of direc-
tors of public companies at level two of the pyramid to be comprised, in certain cases, of at
least one-third of the external directors appointed by a majority of the public shareholders
and for the boards of companies at level three of the pyramid to be comprised of a major-
ity (minus one) of external directors. 32
Another element of the Bill is preventing significant non-finance companies (including
real estate, communications, and energy companies), or their controlling shareholders,
from holding significant finance companies (including banks, insurance companies, and
investment houses).33 This issue reflects the concern that cross-ownership of finance and
non-finance assets, particularly in pyramid holding structures, creates systematic risks for
the Israeli economy, as the controlling shareholders of many highly leveraged, significant
non-finance companies also control financial institutions. For this purpose, the Bill de-
fines a significant finance company as a finance company with more than NIS 40 billion in
assets (or NIS 60 billion if it became significant before enactment).34 A significant non-
finance company has sales exceeding NIS 6 billion (or NIS 7.5 billion, if it became signifi-
cant before enactment); or has credit in Israel (from a bank or non-bank institution) ex-
ceeding NIS 6 billion (or NIS 7.5 billion, if it became significant before enactment).35
Consequently, a holder of both significant finance and non-finance companies will be
forced to sell its holdings in one of the two. Such holders, however, may maintain a
minority stake in the significant finance company so long as the stake does not exceed 10
percent of the company's share capital (or 5 percent in a company that does not have a
controlling shareholder).36
If the Bill passes into law in its present form, many companies are likely to be available
for public purchase, either because they are the prohibited fourth or fifth layer of a chain
of companies controlled by one owner, or because they are a significant finance or non-
finance company held by a shareholder that cannot continue to hold both. Because poten-
tial acquirers of these companies also will have to comply with these provisions - for
instance, a significant non-finance company will not be permitted to purchase the shares
of a significant finance company-the number of potential acquirers in the Israeli market
30. See id. pt. m, §§ 18-27.
31. Id. § 39(e)(1).
32. See id. § 19.
33. See id. pt. IV, §§ 28-41.
34. Id. § 29.
35. Id. § 30.
36. Id. § 32A(b).
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will be limited. Therefore, the Bill, if passed, is likely to open an important window of
opportunity to foreign investors wishing to invest in established Israeli companies.
The Israeli Parliament did not consider the Bill before the elections that took place in
January 2013. Hence, the Bill will be considered only if it is resubmitted following the
elections. Whether the Bill becomes law, and in what form, remains to be seen.
V. Luxembourg
A. THE LAW OF JULY 21, 2012 ON THE MANDATORY SQUEEZE-OUT AND SELL-OUT
A new law introduced in July 201237 applies to securities38 that: (i) are admitted to
trading on a regulated market in one or more European member states; (ii) have been, but
are no longer, admitted to trading on a regulated market in one or more member states; or
(iii) have been the subject of a public offering which gave rise to the obligation to publish a
prospectus in accordance with Article 3 of the Prospectus Directive, 39 and provided that
certain conditions are met (the Securities).40
The new law grants a squeeze-out right (retrait obligatoire) in favor of the majority
shareholders, whereby such majority shareholders may require holders of remaining Se-
curities to sell to them those Securities following a bid.4' The majority shareholders must
first inform the Luxembourg regulator, the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier
(CSSF) of their intention to exercise their right to squeeze-out and shall commit to per-
forming the transaction until completion. The majority shareholders shall also ensure
that they are in a position to provide the entire consideration in cash. The right to
squeeze-out must be exercised at a fair price based on a report drawn up by an indepen-
dent expert. Within one month following the publication of the proposed price, each
holder of the remaining Securities may object to the squeeze-out.
The new law also grants a sell-out right (rachat obligatoire) in favor of the minority
shareholders whereby such minority shareholders have the right to force the majority
shareholders to purchase their shares. 42 Such rights require that a notification is ad-
dressed to the CSSF with respect to the exercise of the sell-out right on a date when:
(1) the conditions stipulated in Article 2(1)(i)-(iii) for the exercise of the sell-out right
are fulfilled;
(2) the acquisition of the Securities by the majority shareholders has been published
within the last three months;
37. The law entered into force on October 1, 2012 and was published in the Luxembourg Official Gazette.
Retrait Obligatoire et Rachat Obligatoire de Titres de Sociitis [Squeeze and Mandatory Redemption of Securities of
Companies], 152 MEMOIUAL: JOURNAL OFFICIEL Du GRAND-DUCHP DE LUXEMBOURG 1859 (2012) [herein-
after Luxembourg Securities Law].
38. The law refers to securities of a company to which voting rights are attached, including certificates
representing shares to which the possibility to give voting instructions is attached. Id. art. I(5).
39. Directive 2003/71, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the Pro-
spectus to be Published when Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending
Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64, 71 (EC).
40. Luxembourg Securities Law, supra note 37, art. 2(l)(i)-(iii).
41. Id. art. 4(1).
42. Id. art. 5.
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(3) the latest sell-out procedure was launched at least two years before the publication
of the CSSF's decision with respect to the fair price. The determination of the
proposed fair price and the opposition procedure are similar to those described
above for the squeeze-out procedure; and
(4) some obligations in terms of notifications and publishing information have been
met for companies having their registered office in Luxembourg.43
The law grants the CSSF authority to ensure that the provisions of the law are ob-
served.44 The CSSF shall publish on its website, for a minimum period of twelve months,
a list of companies for which information has been validly notified. 45
B. IMPLEMENTING THE PROSPECTUS AND TRANSPARENCY DIRECTrVEs
Luxembourg published on July 3, 201246 a law implementing Directive 2010/73/EC47
and modifying the 2005 Luxembourg Law implementing the Prospectus Directive as well
as the 2008 Transparency Directive. Directive 2010/73/EC aims at simplifying the rules
on prospectuses for securities and on information about issuers of transferable securities
on financial markets, as well as upgrading investor protection. The main changes con-
tained in the new Luxembourg law mainly relate to the Prospectus Law and include the
following features:
(1) Enhancement of the requirements for the prospectus summary;
(2) Introduction of the concept of "Key information";
(3) Clarification of the prospectus use in "retail cascades";
(4) Modification of the "qualified investors" definition;
(5) Amendments to the exemption thresholds (i) whereby an offer is within or outside
the scope of the Prospectus Directive (i.e., Part II of the Prospectus Law) and
(ii) relating to the existing exemptions to publish a prospectus;
(6) Clarification of the use of the prospectus by financial intermediaries;
(7) Investors withdrawal rights in case of public offers;
(8) Abolition of the requirement to prepare an annual document summarizing all pub-
lications made in the course of the previous year;
(9) The requirement to have an electronic publication of the approved prospectus;
(10) Larger exemptions for employee participation schemes; and
(11) Clarification of the validity period of a prospectus.
43. See id. art. 5(l)-(2).
44. On October 1, 2012, the CSSF released its circular 12/545 to provide guidance on the scope of applica-
don of the law, the implementation of the squeeze-out and sell-out procedures, and the reporting and disclo-
sure obligations deriving from the law. Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier [CSSF], Circulaire
CSSF 12/545, Oct. 1, 2012 (Lux.).
45. Luxembourg Securities Law, supra note 37, art. 10(3).
46. Loi du 3 Juillet 2012 portant transposition de la directive 2010/73/UE [Law of July 3, 2012 Transpos-
ing Directive 2010/73/EU], 136 MEMORiAL:JoURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHP DE LUXEMBOURG [OF-
FIcIAL GAZET-rE OF LUXEMBOURG] 1725 (2012).
47. Directive 2010/73/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Nov. 24, 2010 Amending
Directives 2003/71/EC on the Prospectus to Be Published when Securities Are Offered to the Public or
Admitted to Trading and 2004/109/EC on the Harmonization of Transparency Requirements in Relation to
Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, 2010 O.J. (L
327) 1, 1 (EC).
VOL. 47
M&A AND JOINT VENTURES 71
C. MODERNIZING THE LAW ON COMMERCIAL COMPANIES
The draft Bill 5730 (originally filed with the Chamber of Deputies on May 15, 2007)
will have a substantial impact on Luxembourg corporate practice as it "relates to the dif-
ferent legal forms of companies and to the various aspects of their corporate life."48 Bill
5730 provides for, inter alia, (i) the creation of a new form of company (the simplified
public limited company), which is inspired by French corporate law (S.A.S.) and whose
main original feature is the devolution to a chairman of the management powers that are
normally those of the board of directors; (ii) the possibility for public and private limited
liability companies to set up an executive committee as part of their management board;
(iii) new provisions regarding the possibility for minority shareholders to commence court
proceedings on behalf of the company, against the management of the company (com-
pared with derivative action); (iv) a judicial share redemption procedure; (v) the express
recognition of the validity voting arrangements between shareholders that was, until now,
never entirely certain; (vi) the possibility to issue bonds by way of private or public issues,
and (vii) as far as public limited liability companies (S.A.s) are concerned, (a) a squeeze-out
procedure, (b) new provisions with regard to a conflict of interest, and (c) the possibility to
issue shares at different par values as well as the possibility to award multiple voting rights
to shares in registered form.49 Bill 5730 will continue to be debated in 2013.
D. DRAFT BILL IMPLEMENTING THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS
DIRECTIVE
Draft Bill 6471,so which was submitted to the Luxembourg Parliament on August 24,
2012, purports to transpose faithfully the provisions of the Alternative Investment Fund
Managers Directive (AIFMD) while also introducing a number of innovations to
strengthen Luxembourg as an alternative investment fund center.5' The bill is expected
to be enacted by the Luxembourg Parliament before the end of 2012.
Pursuant to the regime introduced already by the AIFMD, managers managing or act-
ing as management companies (AIFM) to alternative investment funds (AIFs) with assets
exceeding the specific thresholds introduced by Bill 6471 need to be authorized as AIFM.
Bill 6471 sets out the detailed requirements governing the authorization and supervision
as well the ongoing organizational requirements for the AIFM, including the details relat-
ing to the European Passport. Further, Bill 6471 provides that non-credit institutions
may act as depositaries for AIFs provided certain conditions are met.
Besides the proposed implementation of AIFMD, Bill 6471 also modernizes the existing
common limited partnership (sociitt en commandite simple) regime in order to attract inves-
tors who are familiar to the Anglo-Saxon limited liability partnership model. The Bill also
proposes the creation of a new vehicle, the special limited partnership (sociiti en com-
48. Dirk Leermakers & Gdrald Origer, Luxembourg. Modernising Company Law, Iwr'L FIN. L. REV. Gune 1,
2009), http://www.iflr.com/Article/2239290/Luxembourg-Modernising-company-law.html.
49. See id.
50. See generally Project de Loi 6471 relative aux gestionnaires de fonds d'investissement alternatifs [Bill
6471 on Managers of Alternative Investment Funds], 2011-2012 CHAMBRE DEs DEPLTrrEs [CHAMBER OF
DEPUTfES], Nov. 22, 2012 (Lux.).
51. Bill of Law Implementing the AIFMD into Luxembourg Law Submitted to the Parliament, KPMG (Sept.
2012), httpJ/www.kpmg.co.uk/email/09Sepl2/274342/story03.hunl.
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mandite spiciale). For both such special limited partnerships, the Bill contains a limited
number of de minimis rules offering great flexibility to the partners in terms of organiza-
tion of their partnership. In addition, Bill 6471 introduces a specific tax treatment of the
carried interests received by individual employed by an AIFM (under some restrictive con-
ditions) and clarifies the scope of VAT exemption of management services supplied to
certain types of fund vehicles.
V. The Netherlands
A. NEw LEGISLATION
On October 1, 2012, new legislation with respect to Dutch private limited liability com-
panies (BVs) went into effect.52 The new legislation applies to already existing and newly
formed BVs and supersedes any contradictory clauses in the current articles in existing
BVs.s3 The new legislation is in reaction to criticisms of rigidity in Dutch corporate law
and for the need to remain competitive with other European countries who have simpler
and more flexible corporate laws.5 4 The new laws create more flexibility when incorporat-
ing BVs and setting up governance structures.55 Many restrictive laws geared to protect
shareholders (such as the capital protection laws) were repealed and replaced with laws
which place the onus on the board of directors to protect the BV.56 A failure to do so will
expose directors to liability.57
B. NEw OMrioNs WHEN INCORPORATING A BV
There is no longer a required minimum capital of C18,000 to incorporate a BV.ss Also
repealed are the requirements to have a Dutch bank account or an auditor's statement for
in-kind contributions. 59 These changes have significantly streamlined the process and al-
low for quicker incorporations. 60 In addition, shares are now allowed to be denominated
in currencies other than Euros.6 1 This change is useful for joint ventures and those struc-
turing their activities through the Netherlands as it will allow for the use of one currency
throughout the group.
Shares without voting rights are now allowed,62 as are shares without rights to profits.63
This is useful for joint ventures or transactions that need to be structured to match invest-
ment profiles. In addition, shareholding in a BV may now be subject to certain compul-
52. See Wet vereenvoudiging enflexibilisering bv-recht [Act on Simpler and More Flexible Laws ofPrivate Limited






58. This requirement was removed from Article 2:178 of the Dutch Civil Code. See id.
59. This requirement was removed from Article 2:203a of the Dutch Civil Code. See id.
60. Under the old system incorporations could take upwards of several weeks, as many of the incorporation
requirements were often time consuming and difficult for foreign nationals to comply with.
61. Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] art. 2:178(2) (Neth.).
62. Id. art. 2:228(4)-(5).
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sory requirements64 and non-compliance may lead to sanctions (i.e., voting restrictions,
profit sharing, or an obligation to sell shares).65 The new laws also allow shareholders to
appoint their own board members.66 Previously, shareholders needed to create a
workaround so that they could include many of these commonly used governance struc-
tures in their ventures. This would be typically done in a separate shareholders agree-
ment. The trouble with this approach is that because these obligations were not legally
recognized, specific performance to enforce a breach was not available.
C. CHANGES To EXISTING BVs
Under the old law, the payment of dividends was subject to an equity preservation test
and could only be distributed if there were sufficient reserves to do so. Because most of
the capital protection laws 67 were abolished this has resulted in a new test which requires
the board to approve all dividends, unless the board knows or reasonably could foresee
that the BV will not be able to continue paying its debts within twelve months of payment
of the dividend.68 A failure to comply with this requirement will result in joint and several
liability for the BV's board.69
Also simplified are the formal rules for shareholder meetings. Notice periods for share-
holder meetings have been shortened from fifteen to eight days, 70 and meetings may now
be held outside of the Netherlands. 7' Shareholders of specific classes may now be given
certain exclusive rights (such as voting, board appointment, or profits), 72 which, under the
old system, could only be given to all shareholders collectively.
VII. Sweden
A. NEW TAKE-OVER RULES
On February 13, 2012, the Swedish Corporate Governance Board (the SCGB), which
forms part of the self-regulation system on the Swedish securities market, published a
proposal for revised takeover rules for stock exchanges (the Takeover Rules).73 Under the
Securities Markets Act, a stock exchange (birs) shall have rules regarding takeover offers
63. Id. art. 2:216(1)-(2). Even though the new law is flexible on this point, the law does require that at all
times at least one voting share should be held by a party other than the BV or one of its subsidiaries. See id.
art. 2:175(1).
64. Id. art. 2:192.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 2:242(1).
67. Examples are laws prohibiting financial assistance or limiting share buy-backs and capital reductions.
See id. arts. 2:203-2:216 (before Oct. 1, 2012).
68. Id. art. 2:216(3).
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 2:225.
71. Id. art. 2:226(1).
72. Id. art. 2:227(2).
73. SWEDISH CORPORATE GoVERNANcE BD. [SCGBI, PROPOSED REVISED RULES CONCERNING TAKE-
OVER BIDS ON NASDAQ OMX STOCKHOLMI AND NoRDic GROlfH MARIG-r NGM (Feb. 9, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.corporategovemanceboard.se/media/59426/takeover%20rules%202012.pdf.
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for shares admitted to trading on the exchange's regulated markets.74 Such rules shall
fulfill the requirements laid down in the EC Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC7s and be
appropriate. 76 The SCGB's revised rules, effective July 1, 2012, have been implemented
by Sweden's two stock exchanges, the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm AB and the Nordic
Growth Market NGM AB.78 The changes include:
(a) Emphasis that deal protection agreements (e.g., no-shop provisions and break fees)
should be entered into only if deemed justified for special reasons;79
(b) Introduction of an information requirement regarding any holdings of financial
instruments which give the offeror financial exposure equivalent to a shareholding
in the offeree, such as cash-settled equity swaps;so and
(c) A requirement that bonus arrangements offered to employees of the offeree re-
quire prior approval of the board of the offeree and disclosure to shareholders.81
B. PROSPECTUS DIREcTVE
On July 1, 2012, amendments to the Swedish Financial Instruments Trading ActS2 en-
tered into force.83 The amendments were made to implement directives 2010/73/EU and
2003/71/EC. The main amendments are:
(a) Exceptions from the duty to publish a prospectus when offering transferable secur-
ities to the public has been increased by raising certain thresholds;84
(b) Some types of securities issues will be subject to less comprehensive disclosure
requirements (e.g., applicable to small companies, small lenders, rights issues and
government guarantee schemes);85
74. See 13 ch. 8 § LAG OM VARDEPAPPERSMARKNADEN [SECURITIES MARKET AcT] (Svenskforfattning-
ssamling [SFS] 2007:528) (Swed.).
75. Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover
Bids, 2004 OJ. (L 142) 25 (EC).
76. See 13 ch. 8 § LAG OM VARDEPAPPERSMARKNADEN [SECURITIES MARKET Acr] (SFS 2007:528)
(Swed.).
77. NASDAQ OMX, THE RULES CONCERNING TAKEOVER BIDS ON THE STOCK MARKET (uly 1, 2012)
[hereinafter TAKEOVER RULES], available at www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/80/80374_takeover_
rules_2012_07_01.pdf.
78. NORDIc GROWTH MARKET [NGM), RULES CONCERNING TAKEOVER BIDS ON NGM EQuITY (July
1, 2012), available at http://www.ngm.se/doc-archive/NGM-C3%B6rsen/Marknads%C3%B6vervakning/
Takeover regler/Takeover%2ORules%20for%20NGM%2OEquity%20applicable%20from%201 %20July%
202012.pdf.
79. See TAKEOVER RULES, supra note 77, at 43-44.
80. Id. at 14, 63.
81. Id. at 12, 14, 43, 63.
82. LAG OM HANDEL MED FINANSIELLA INSTRUMENT [ACT ON TRADING IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
(Svensk fbrfattningssamling [SFS] 1991:980) (Swed.).
83. LAG OM ANDRING I LAGEN (1991:980) OM HANDEL MED FINANSIELLA INSTRUMENr [ACT AMENDING
THE ACT (1991:980) ON FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TRADING] (Svensk farfatmingssamling [SFS] 2012:378)
(Swed.).
84. Id. 2 ch. 3 §.
85. See Commission Regulation 486/2012, of 30 March 2012 Amending Regulation 809/2004 as Regards
the Format and the Content of the Prospectus, the Base Prospectus, the Summary and the Final Terms and as
Regards the Disclosure, 2012 OJ. (L 150) 7 (EU).
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(c) The format and content of the prospectus summary have been improved;8 6
(d) Disclosure requirements that overlapped with the Transparency Directive 2004/
109/EC have been repealed;87 and
(e) The definition of "qualified investors" is now aligned with that of "professional
clients" as defined in the directive 2004/39/EC.88
C. TAX
Interest deductions have historically been used, through intra-group loans and often in
connection with M&A transactions, to move taxable profits out of Sweden.89 For this
reason, restrictions on interest deductions were implemented in Sweden in 2009. These
restrictions prevented tax deductions for interest payments on intra-group loans to the
extent attributable to acquisitions of shares from affiliated companies. To prevent aggres-
sive debt financing and debt push-down transactions, Sweden has, effective January 1,
2013, introduced additional restrictions on interest deductions.90
The new restrictions on interest deductions generally cover all debts to affiliated com-
panies, regardless of the purpose of the loan.91 As a result, external acquisitions of shares
and regular financing for acquisitions of businesses or assets will fall within the scope.92
An exemption from the general rule applies if tax is levied with at least 10 percent on the
interest, and the main reason behind the debt structuring is other than to achieve consid-
erable tax benefits for the affiliated companies.93 As the new restriction will apply for
interest accruing in 2013 and forward, this will also affect existing loans.94
VIII. Turkey
Turkey has become a prominent environment for investments. In 2011, M&A transac-
tions reached a peak of 241 deals corresponding to a volume of US $15 billion,95 whereas
the expected value for 2012 is US $20 billion. Key sectors attracting investors are listed as
86. 1 ch. I §, 2 ch. 14 § LAG OM ANDRING I LAGEN (1991:980) OM HANDEL MED FINANSIELLA INSTRU-
MENr [AcT ON TRADING IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS) (SFS 2012:378) (Swed.).
87. Id. I ch. 8 §, 6 ch. 16 §, 2 ch. 20 §, 4 ch. 20 §, 6 ch. 1 §; LAG OM ANMALNINGSSKYLDIGHET FOR VISSA
INNEHAV AV FINANSIELLA INSTRUMENT [LAW ON OBLIGATIONS FOR CERTAIN HOLDINGS OF FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTs] (Svensk fdrfattningssamling [SFSI 2000:1087) (Swed.).
88. 1 ch. 1 § LAG OM ANDRING I LAGEN (1991:980) OM HANDEL MED FINANSIELLA INSTRUMENr [AcT
ON TRADING IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTs] (SFS 2012:378) (Swed.).
89. Sweden has no thin capitalization rules.
90. The formal bill covering new restrictons for interest deductions passed the Swedish Parliament on
November 21, 2012. See Finansutskottets betinkande 2012/2013:FiUI [Finance Committee Report] (Swed.).
91. INKOMSTSKATTELAGEN [LNCOME TAX ACT] (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS) 1999:1229) 24 ch.
10(a)-(b) T[ (Swed.).
92. Id.
93. Id. 24 ch. 10(d) 'j.
94. See 2012/13:FiUL.
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food and beverages, banking and financial services, and energy and mining for the first
half of 2012, in light of the total number of deals.96
Although the center of business attention from a M&A perspective, an exclusive legisla-
tion regulating M&A activities does not exist in Turkey. Accordingly, different laws and
regulations should be taken into consideration when determining the applicable rules in
this respect. A significant development that is noteworthy enough to mention is the new
Turkish Commercial Code (TCC) and the new Turkish Code of Obligations (TCO), both
of which came into force on July 1, 2012.97 In addition to amending implementations in
Turkish law, the TCC and TCO, respectively, also brought certain changes to M&A
applications.
A. MERGERS
Per the TCC, a merger may be effected by either (i) an acquisition of a company by
another (a merger in the form of acquisition) or (ii) a merger of more than one company
under a newly established company (a new formation). Further, contrary to the former
commercial code, the TCC allows mergers between different types of companies. Merger
in cases of liquidation, insolvency, or equalization benefits the other newly introduced
applications under the TCC.
Another issue that the TCC addresses is employees in case of a merger. Certain dis-
crepancies exist between the labor law and the TCC. The TCC appears to be more
employee-friendly because it grants employees a right of objection and introduces joint
liability for former and current employers. Relevant provisions of the TCC also provide
employees with a right to request security with respect to their receivables. When the will
of the legislative authority is considered, in case of a conflict, the provisions of the TCC
prevail.98
B. AcQuisrnoNs
Acquisitions may either be structured as share transfers or asset transfers. Both forms of
transactions, from a buyer's perspective, should be handled diligently to prevent future
problems. In addition to tax and finance related matters, labor law considerations should
also be observed in an acquisition deal.
In accordance with the TCO, in the case of an asset transfer, the transferee will be held
liable to the creditors for the debts thereof when it has notified them of the transfer, or
announced the same in the trade registry gazette, or one of the national newspapers, ac-
cordingly. The transferor will remain jointly liable with the transferee for two years start-
ing from the (i) date of notification or announcement (for the debts due), or (ii) the date of
maturity. A notable amendment to the TCO is that the two-year joint liability period
96. Turkey Leads the Way in Region for Mergers and Acquisition, PORTTURKEY (Nov. 5, 1012, 3:20 PM),
http-//www.portturkey.com/enterprise/3535-turkey-leads-the-way-in-region-for-mergers-and-acquisition.
97. Mustafa Alp, Yeni Turk Ticaret Kanunu'na Gotre Bohinme, Birlepme ve Tur Degirtine'nin 4 Ilifkilerine
Etkisi [According to the New Turkish Commercial Code Division, Impact of Mergers and Type Switching Business
Relations], CAuSmA VE TOPLUM 51 (an. 2012), available at http://calismatoplum.org/sayi32/alp.pdf.
98. Id. at 54.
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does not commence unless the notification or announcement obligation of the transferee
is fulfilled.
C. COMPETITION BOARD APPROVAL
M&A transactions, depending on certain criteria determined under Communiqu6 No.
2012/43, may be subject to the approval of the Competition Board (CB). From January
until October 2012, the CB concluded 227 decisions in respect of M&A and joint venture
applications. While approving 204 of them, the CB decided that 23 applications were not
subject to approval, which, in other words, means that there were no disapprovals or con-
ditioned approvals. According to the records of the CB, it is understood that no merger
applications were made, since 150 of the applications were listed as acquisitions and 77 of
them were joint ventures. 99
IX. Ukraine
A. SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS IN UKRAINE
Due to the conservatism of Ukrainian legislation and existing court practice, the share-
holders' agreements may not be yet fully applied and enforced in Ukraine. 00 Particularly,
existing court practice tends to substantially limit the scope of contractual regulation by
saying that most of the corporate issues fall under imperative norms of the law - a deci-
sion that may not be changed by the parties' agreement. The existing court practice ex-
pressly forbids regulating the following issues by means of any contract whatsoever:
(1) relations between the shareholders in respect of corporate governance matters;
(2) divergent voting procedure at the General Meeting and other corporate bodies
(BoD, supervisory board);
(3) divergent procedure of appointment of members of BoD or supervisory board; and
(4) in general, the shareholders' agreement may not amend or somehow substitute the
law.
In addition, foreign law may not govern the shareholders' agreements, and disputes may
not be transferred to an arbitration court.
B. NEW PERSPECTIVES IN REGULATION OF LLCs
2012 brought new hopes for crucial change in legal regulation of limited liability com-
panies (LLCs). This year, the new Draft Law on Limited Liability Companies and Addi-
tional Liability Companies was expanded.' 0' The draft law contains the following positive
99. Current Decision Statistics for the Year 2012, REKABET KURUMU [TURKISH COMPETITION AUrHORIT),
http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/default.aspx?nsw=j6VYScQKgFGNstJ2P lj39g==-SgKWD+pQltw=&nm=321
(last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (listing links to Current Decision Statistics for each month of 2012).
100. See Shareholders' Agreements: Theory and Practical Application in Ukraine, PRAvovA DOPOMOGA fuly 12,
2012), http://pravdop.com/en/publications/kommentarii-zakonodatelstvalakcionernie-soglasheniya-te-
oriya.i-praktikaprimeneniya-v.ukraine/.
101. COMMERCIAL LAW CTR., DRAr-r LAW "ON LLMIrED LIABILrrY COMPANIES AND ADDITIONAL LIA-
BILITY COMPANIES" 35 (une 18, 2012), available at http://www.commerciallaw.com.ua/en/law-aboullow-
projects.
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novelties. First, the participants are entitled to enter into agreement, a concept similar to
Shareholders' Agreements, namely, the agreement may provide for additional obligations
imposed on the company's participants and liability for breach. Second, the procedure of
exclusion of participants who ignore the management of the company or breach their
statutory obligations, and the procedure for subsequent settlements therewith, became
more clear and transparent. Finally, the draft law legitimizes the so called derivative
claims, i.e., claims filed with a court by any participant on behalf of the company against
an officer of company who breached his obligations or abused his powers, or applications
for invalidation of the agreement concluded by the company.
C. ANTI-MONOPOLY CLEARANCE FOR M&A TRANsAcTIONs
A key problem in enhancing Ukraine's investment attractiveness is the extremely low
thresholds of financial performance of the parties to the M&A deals, which require ob-
taining merger clearance. The Law provides for the need to obtain a merger clearance, if
the aggregate sales turnover or the value of all participants' assets exceeds 012 million. 102
And simultaneously:
(1) aggregate value of assets or sales turnover, including those abroad, by at least two
participants to the transaction exceeds £1 million for the preceding financial year;
and
(2) aggregate value of assets or sales turnover in the territory of Ukraine by at least
one participant to the transaction exceeds £1 million for the preceding financial
year.
Therefore, almost every transaction requires approval with Ukrainian antitrust authori-
ties. Furthermore, it also concerns foreign-to-foreign deals that also require preliminary
merger clearance.
Covering the question on recent tendencies of legislation in this area, Draft Law 3436
increases the threshold up to £50 million for all participants of a deal and up to C4 million
for at least two of them.
The other issue that is not clearly regulated by Ukrainian legislation is the distinction
between mergers and concerted practices. Under the law, concerted practices are, in par-
ticular, the establishment of a joint venture by undertakings, which may result in the coor-
dination of their competitive behavior. 03 In practice, ambiguity may result in the need to
obtain clearance for concerted practices while establishing a JV between the competing
undertakings. Taking into account growing fines for failure to obtain merger clearance,
this clearance procedure is the priority.
102. Ilpo 3axacT eKoHOMiqHoi KoHKypeHUil [CoMPErfoN LAW OF UKRAINE], YxPaYHChKHri napnameHT
(VERKHOVNA RADA) [UKAmNIAN PARLIAMETrr], Jan. 11, 2001, No. 2210-, art. 24 (Ukr.), available at
http,//zakon2.rada.gov.uallaws/show/2210-14/printl350370660600469.
103. Id. art. 5.
VOL. 47
M&A AND JOINT VENTURES 79
X. United States
A. NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS AND INTERESTED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
Two Delaware Supreme Court decisions, Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vukan
Materials Company and RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc.,104 under-
score the importance of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) to the M&A process. The
Marietta decision addressed whether an NDA without an explicit standstill provision may
nonetheless prohibit a party receiving confidential information from engaging in a hostile
takeover. The parties entered into an NDA and a separate joint defense agreement that,
collectively, limited use of confidential information to evaluating a transaction "between"
the parties and prohibited Marietta from disclosing confidential information except where
such disclosure would be required by law. Affirming the Chancery Court's decision to
enjoin Marietta's exchange offer and proxy contest, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that Marietta breached the use and disclosure restrictions because the parties appeared to
have contemplated using the confidential information only in connection with a friendly
transaction and Marietta voluntarily disclosed the information to third parties.105
The RAA Management decision addressed whether a disclaimer of reliance clause in an
NDA can defeat claims based on fraudulent misstatements made by the seller during the
due diligence phase of a transaction. The non-reliance provision disclaimed "any" repre-
sentation or warranty as to the accuracy of the evaluation material and a waiver by RAA of
"any" claims in connection with the transaction unless a definitive agreement was
signed. 06 Relying on the plain language of the provisions, as well as prior case law, the
Court held that the NDA barred RAA's claim, even if Savage Sports knowingly made
material fraudulent misrepresentations.10 7 The Court noted that the efficient functioning
of M&A markets favors allowing sophisticated actors to allocate risk by disclaiming reli-
ance on representations made outside a definitive agreement.
Another significant Delaware Supreme Court case, Americas Mining Corp. v. Ther-
iault,08 affirmed the Chancery Court's record-setting damages award of more than US $2
billion and US $304 million in attorneys' fees.109 Applying the entire fairness standard of
review, the court held that the controlling stockholder and affiliated directors of the ac-
quiring company breached their fiduciary duties by approving an interested transaction at
a price that was unfair to the minority stockholders.11 0 Rejecting an argument that the
Chancery Court erred in refusing to allocate the burden of proof before trial, the Supreme
Court held that the burden of proof to demonstrate the entire fairness of an interested
transaction remains with defendants throughout trial if the record does not permit a pre-
trial determination."1 Furthermore, the court determined that the damages award and
104. See Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., - A.2d -, No. 254, 2012, 2012 WL
2783101 (Del. 2012); RAA Mgmt., LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107 (Del. 2012).
105. Marietta, 2012 WL 2783101, at *9-14.
106. RAA Mgmr., 45 A.3d at 110-11.
107. Id. at 112-15.
108. 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
109. Id. at 1262-63.
110. Id. at 1218.
111. Id. at 1243.
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attorneys' fees were the product of an orderly and logical process well supported by the
record.112
B. PRE-MERGER NOTIFICATION RULES
On September 25, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice announced"23 that Biglari
Holdings Inc. agreed to an US $850,000 civil penalty to settle claims that Biglari violated
the premerger notification requirements under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act when Biglari acquired shares of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. in
2011.114 The HSR Act and HSR rules provide a filing exemption for stock acquisitions
made "solely for the purpose of investment," as long as the acquirer does not hold over 10
percent of the issuer's voting securities as a result of the acquisition." 5 The FTC con-
cluded that Biglari's acquisitions of Cracker Barrel shares did not qualify for the invest-
ment only exemption based on evidence that Biglari intended to become actively involved
in the management and direction of Cracker Barrel's business. This proceeding sends a
message to the investment community that claims of exemptions from the HSR Act will
be closely scrutinized.
112. Id. at 1249-62.
113. Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Biglari Holdings Inc. to Pay $850,000 Civil Penalty for Violating Anti-
trust Premerger Notification Requirements (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/Septem-
ber/12-at-l l52.html.
114. See Complaint, United States v. Biglari Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01586, 2012 WL 4364416 (D.tD.C.
Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f287300/287335.pdf.
115. 16 C.F.R. § 802.9 (2005).
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